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The Strategic Effects of South
Asian Nuclear Proliferation
Gregory Paul Domin
Mercer University
This essa y analyzes the factors underlying
nuclear tens ions in South Asia and how governments
and organizations working toward nonproliferation
and arms control
are prepared-or
not prepared-to
deal with this problem
in the post-Cold
War era . The essay then examines the
different
methods to disarmament,
nuclear ownership ,
and bargaining in India and Pakistan , two states that are
o nly beginning
to learn the utility of arms control in
ma intaining nuclear stability
in South Asia . The essay
concludes by making several recommendations
that can
be met only by concurrent
efforts among a variety of
parties . Although
the highest
responsibility
remains
those of the governments
in the region , attention and acti on from parties outside of the region are also needed to
benefit nonproliferation
efforts in South Asia, as well as
maintaining nuclear stability in the area .

INTRODUCTION

he May 1998 nuclear tests by both India and Pakistan,
accompanied by the expressed intentions of both nations
to become full-fledged nuclear weapon states, present the
prospect of a new nuclear arms race in South Asia. Perhaps even
more ominous is the potential for these events to promote degradation of security relations and proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction beyond the region. This viewpoint addresses the future of nuclear nonproliferation from the broader prospects of the
new circumstances in the region.
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If the international community is unwilling to take a
clear, affirmative decision to abandon reliance on nuclear weapons, the number of states possessing nuclear weapons will
probably increase in the next decade or so. Stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons, even to non-state actors such as terrorists groups, will be harder. The window of opportunity for
reducing the likelihood of these scenarios is closing.
This essay examines India 's decision to test a nuclear
explosive as well as Pakistan 's response and the global consequences of such actions. It then examines the important links
between the South Asian nuclear tests and proliferation problems
more generally. The reasons for India 's and Pakistan 's decisions
to test nuclear weapons are numerous. This viewpoint focuses on
the links between the tests and the circumstances elsewhere in
the region to draw attention to the expanding number of reinforcing relationships among proliferation aspirants. In particular ,
an explanation of these links reveals that the South Asian nuclear
tests were more a symptom than a cause of the now visibly
weakening Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). These links also
show that the task of curbing the spread of weapons of mass destruction has become more complicated, demanding new strategies on the parts of those governments and organizations working to achieve nonproliferation goals.
The essay then examines existing Indian and Pakistani
efforts to manage the nuclear competition in South Asia. It argues that a durable nuclear peace in South Asia rests on the ability of these adversaries to overcome a formidable array of political, psychological, and bureaucratic obstacles to establishing an
effective nonproliferation regime in this region .
The essay concludes by arguing that these efforts at nonproliferation in South Asia can only be achieved by the concurrent efforts among a variety of players. Although the highest responsibilities remain among those of the governments in the reTHE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
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gion, attention and action from parties outside the region are also
needed-most particularly from the United States, but also from
other governments and non-governmental organizations. The
current dilemmas in South Asia can be resolved only through
strategies of comprehensive engagement on the parts of both
governments and non-governmental organizations. Although the
nuclear tests of the past year seems to have derailed efforts of
nonproliferation in the region, concerted action offers reasonable
hope of placing nonproliferation efforts on a course consistent
with global peace and security in the twenty-first century.
INDIA'S DECISION TO TEST

It is clear that the Bharatiya Party authorized a series of
tests for which there was no compelling strategic necessity. The
party came into office determined to carry out the tests. It did not
consult the Parliament nor conduct a promised strategic defense
review before reversing the national consensus . The Hindu-right
in India has advocated nuclearization since 1951, thirteen years
before China acquired nuclear weapons. Now, the "sacred cow"
of national security has been invoked to mask the ideological and
electoral interests of the ruling coalition and the vested interests
of India's nuclear and defense civilian-scientific sector.
Authorization of the tests and the proclamation of India's
status, although inter-related, must be distinguished for purposes
of analysis . On the one hand, the timing of the Indian tests were
determined by the electoral compulsions of a politically shaky
coalition in India. The timing was also influenced by arguments
from India's "bomb lobby," which feared that a growing international norm against horizontal proliferation might forever foreclose India's option to test. On the other hand, India's decision to
declare itself a nuclear weapon state has more to do with the
Hindu-right's ideological motivations and the changing self-
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perceptions oflndia 's strategic elite, in their search for a separate
Indian national identity.
In their quest for modernization, India 's state and political managers have faithfully reproduced Western norms and
culture in the area of national security. In doing so, they have
come to regard a nuclear deterrent as the ultimate measure of
national power and a symbol of modernity, scientific excellence,
and a higher strategic culture . Nuclear weapons , they hope, will
bolster India 's prestige and consolidate its profile as an emerging
great power in the international system.
At the core of India's decision, therefore, is the socialization of its ruling elite into a cultural belief that nuclear weapons and status constitute legitimate means to enhance the domestic prestige of the state and expand its power in the international system. Ironically, such beliefs are themselves the expression of a colonized mindset that lacks self-esteem and a nationstate that suffers from a historical inferiority complex .
In many respects, however, India has been right that the
non-weapon states that are parties to the NPT have used the
treaty to perpetuate a double standard. Indian Prime Minister
Atal Behari Vajpayee had a point when he observed , at the fiftieth anniversary of his country's Atomic Energy Commission in
November 1998, that "a few nations are sitting on huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons," and concluded that their policy of
"insisting on collective restraint on the part of the rest of the
world is an inherently unstable proposition" (Reuters 1998, A2).
The belief that the nuclear weapon states are committed to an
indefinite monopoly of these weapons in order to enhance their
prestige and power at the expense of other states contributed to
the Indian decision to resume testing. Now both India and Pakistan have added themselves to the number of states claiming to
seek a nuclear-weapon-free world of retaining nuclear arsenals.
The addition of the world's sixth and seventh declared nuclear
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
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arsenals has exacerbated pressure for proliferation. This is not
only because more states now openly contend that nuclear weapons are vital to them, but also because the addition of two more
states with nuclear weapons threatens the integrity of the NPT
regime, however imperfectly, to accommodate only five nuclear
weapons states.
Although both the 1974 and 1998 Indian nuclear explosive tests were conducted primarily for domestic political reasons, the Indian Government explained both with language taken
from the NPT. In 1974, then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi carefully emphasized that India's first nuclear test was a "peaceful
nuclear explosion" permitted under Article V of the NPT
(Thaker 1999, 14). Similarly, when Prime Minister Vajpayee declared, following the May 1998 tests, "that India is a nuclear
weapon state," his use of treaty terminology affirmed the centrality of the NPT to the existing international security environment as surely as his country's action undermined the regime.
Contrary to Prime Minister Vajpayee's assertion, India
can never be a nuclear weapon state. "Nuclear weapon state" is
defined in Article IX of the NPT as a state having detonated a
nuclear explosive before 1967 (Albright 1998, 21). Prime Minister Vajpayee's claim to this legal term is an anachronism, as is
the notion that India has attained some sort of "nuclear status" by
exploding nuclear weapons. The age of the "nuclear club" is at
the end. Any distinction India thinks it has achieved in crashing
the gate will be washed away if its actions help usher in an age
of "nuclear rabble," where many states and some sub-state actors
have nuclear weapons.
The NPT regime is the international community's best
tool for limiting nuclear proliferation and moving toward nuclear
disarmament. The regime, however, is far from perfect, and
frankly, is capable of doing more. For example, the nuclear
weapon states should do much more to live up to their Article VI
VOL. 28 2000
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disarmament obligations, such as negotiating deeper cuts in nuclear arsenals and agreeing not to use nuclear weapons first.
Such actions would help discredit the assertion that the NPT is
discriminatory . India itself has railed against this perceived inequality for twenty-eight years, but its recent decision to surrender
the moral high ground by declaring itself a nuclear weapon state
threatens the NPT regime and its goal of eventual nuclear disarmament.
PAKISTAN'S RESPONSE

After India 's nuclear tests in May 1998, the world held
its collective breath . When Pakistan conducted its own nuclear
tests, Prime Minister Vajpayee claimed "we are now vindicated,"
as if a Pakistani wrong could right an Indian wrong (Ali 1999,
14). India was not vindicated but rather confirmed in a destructive path. On 28 May 1998, the idea of a nuclear proliferation
chain in South Asia stopped being a speculation and became a
sad reality. The other shoe dropped, but it is now frighteningly
clear that the "other shoe" may not be the last. We have seen a
clear demonstration that nuclear proliferation is selfperpetuating ; and the fact that these new potential nuclear combatants stand, as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has observed, "cheek by jowl...creates a uniquely dangerous situation"
(Diamond 1998, 2).
Although India has denied parity between itself and
Pakistan, strategic nuclear parity is the result that proliferation in
both states has produced . India is much larger and, in economic
and conventional military terms, much stronger than Pakistan.
However, with nuclear weapons on both sides, India 's enormous
military advantage is somewhat neutralized, as then US Ambassador to India Patrick Moynihan expressed to Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi following India 's "peaceful nuclear explosion" in
1974:
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
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India has made a huge mistake. Here you were the
number one hegemonic power in South Asia . Nobody
was number two and call Pakistan number three.
Now in a decade's time, some Pakistani general will
call you up and say I have four nuclear weapons and I
want Kashmir. If not, we will drop them on you and
we will all meet in heaven. And then what do you
do? (Kux 1993, 305).

The fundamental effect of the other shoe dropping is that
South Asia has just moved closer to the edge of a regional nuclear war that could claim the lives of millions. As Iranian Foreign Minister Kharazzi told the Conference on Disarmament in
June 1998, "The nuclear sword of Damocles is now hanging
over the region by a thread" (Whittle 1998, Al).
The open acquisition of nuclear weapons has made the
use of nuclear weapons more likely than at any time since the
beginning of the Cold War, with the possible exception of the
Cuban Missile Crisis. The peaceful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis had as much to do with luck as with stable deterrence.
The world can ill afford another Cuban Missile Crisis, this time
in Kashmir . The fortuitous outcome of the crisis and the absence
of nuclear war since then represents a chance at peace that humankind should be bound by its survival instinct to grasp. If
every nation risks rolling the nuclear dice, eventually, those dice
will turn up snake eyes and we will all lose.
GLOBAL CONSEQUENCES

The immediate implications of nuclear proliferation in
South Asia extend beyond the subcontinent. For instance, it is
possible that some predominantly Muslim states could view a
Pakistani nuclear arsenal as a deterrent to the possibility of Israel
even using a weapon of mass destruction against them. In this
context, Israel could come to believe that a Pakistani nuclear ar-
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senal threatens Israeli defense programs or installations. Consequently, it is conceivable that Pakistani acquisition of nuclear
weapons could further destabilize already strained relationships
among groups of different faiths. On his arrival in Islamabad on
June 1, Iranian Foreign Minister Kharrazi announced that "from
all over the world, Muslims are happy that Pakistan has this capability" (Diamond 1998). Days later in Saudi Arabia, Pakistani
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif assured the world that "nuclear
weapons have no religion" (Anderson 1998). However, intentions do not always equate with outcome: history is replete with
examples of religious zeal igniting conflict when reason would
have dictated caution.
Beyond the short-term strategic instability South Asian
nuclear arsenals may generate, nuclear proliferation on the subcontinent threatens to destroy the NPT regime on which the rest
of the world bases its security. When its parties again review the
NPT in 2000-the first Review Conference incorporating the
enhanced review process agreed upon in 1995-its performance
in preventing proliferation and encouraging disarmament will be
assessed critically. If the South Asia nuclear tests result in forcing open the door to the "nuclear club" and India, a longtime
declaratory proponent of nuclear disarmament, joins the ranks of
those states that rely on the threat of using nuclear weapons for
their security, the continued viability of the NPT will be in serious question. If state parties to the NPT see the world moving in
the direction of declaratory reliance on nuclear weapons for security, they will be pressured to adopt a policy of such reliance
themselves and be more reluctant to rely on the NPT regime .
An even greater threat lurks behind the possible dissolution of the NPT regime . Its collapse could trigger the emergence
of a "nuclear rabble," increasing the threat of nuclear terrorism .
There is no reason to believe that India and Pakistan will be immune from the protection, control, and accountability problems
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
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that have faced other states with nuclear arsenals. Even if other
states do not follow India and Pakistan's example, more weapons
and weapon-usable material, stored in more locations , and accessible to more individuals , increase the likelihood that nuclear
weapons will be used accidentally or without authorization , or
that weapons or materials will be diverted or stolen . While a
number of states currently possess weapon-usable nuclear material, further acquisition of nuclear weapons by India, Pakistan ,
and possibly other states can only exacerbate this problem.
In the early 1960s, some predicated that there would be
20 or 30 nuclear weapon states by the end of the 1970s. Fortunately, the international community saw the dangers of nuclear
proliferation and chose to work toward only the viable alternative, a world ultimately free of nuclear weapons, by negotiating
the NPT. The NPT has served as the principal bulwark against
widespread nuclear proliferation , and no state declared a new
nuclear weapon capability during the first twenty-eight years of
its operation. However, India's recent actions, coupled with inaction by nuclear weapon states (NWS) , have placed this essential tool in acute danger. If the NPT begins to unravel or even
collapses, the most terrifying predictions of the past may not be
bad enough to describe the future. If nonproliferation is to be
possible, it must be chosen and pursued concurrently .
PROLIFERATION LINKAGES IN SOUTH ASIA AND BEYOND

Although India 's five nuclear tests on May 3 and 5 were
widely criticized, they met with rather tepid reactions from the
world community (Disarmament Diplomacy 1998, 51) that were
certainly insufficient to stave off Pakistan's "retaliatory" nuclear
tests. With both countries accelerating development of sophisticated medium-range ballistic missiles and with nuclear
"weaponization" perhaps already underway, the tests and policy
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declarations of both countries have raised the specter of a spiraling nuclear arms race in the region.
Two sets of issues raise questions as to whether a nuclear
standoff between India and Pakistan would be as stable or enduring as that between the US and the Soviet Union proved to
be: first, these countries ' history of war and crisis, coupled with
their contemporary grievances, despite a period of recent
"warmed " relations , suggest a relatively greater prospect for future conflicts in which deliberate nuclear attack might be contemplated. Neither country is a "status quo" state for which deterring attack is a sufficient end. The ardent cultural and religious
dimensions of this relationship are a particular source of uncertainty. Though both countries share important bonds and in past
wars have shown some propensity to restrain the use of force,
there remains clear prospects that crises could release deep animosities that overwhelm the kind of sober rationality assumed by
theories of mutual deterrence.
Second, the countries ' territorial proximity is a crucial
new variable. The US and the Soviet Union, at a similarly early
stage in their nuclear rivalry, could deliver nuclear weapons only
by aircraft and therefore had hours of warning time of an attack.
By the time of deployment of ballistic missiles reduced this margin to ranges of O to 30 minutes, the Cold War rivals had acquired many years of experience with their nuclear relationship
that thereby helped maintain stability. In contrast, India and
Pakistan could traverse from latent nuclear ability to overt nuclear rivalry by deploying nuclear-armed ballistic missiles with
flight times as short as three minutes. This possibility dramatically limits reaction times in crisis decision making and hence
prospectively increases the danger of an inadvertent nuclear
war.
1
For an argument that this circumstance would create strong temptations for pre-emp tive
and "launch-on-warning" strategies, placing tremendous time-critical pressures on decision makers and command and control systems with past histories of incoherence and no
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However, a more worrisome-and far less studied-implication of the prospects of a nuclear arms race between India
and Pakistan is its potential cause to spiraling repercussions outside of South Asia. Many states in Asia and elsewhere in the
world will be watching the progress of events with keen interest,
and this progression is likely to have effects in other regions that
will be difficult to anticipate.
The potential importance of such links between circumstances in South Asia and elsewhere is evinced in part by the role
such links played in leading up to the South Asian nuclear tests
themselves. Thus far, most attention has focused on those factors
indigenous to the region, including the Indian-Pakistani relationship, Indian and Pakistani domestics policies, and Indian and
Pakistani perceptions of external actors (such as China, the US,
and the nonproliferation regime). Less attention, however, has
been focused on the links between proliferation developments in
South Asia and the roles played by actors and concurrent developments elsewhere in Asia and the world, particularly in contributing to India's and Pakistan's nuclear missile development
programs.
For example, assertions that China provided Pakistan
with assistance in its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development are well known. Pakistan reportedly has obtained from
China crucial technology to support its nuclear program as well
as complete M-11 nuclear-capable missiles. More recently,
China is believed to have supplied plans and equipment to enable
Pakistan to construct a factory for indigenous production of the
missile. With a range of only about 300 kilometers, however,
these missiles do not enable Pakistan to strike major Indian cities
(Sheppard 1998; Bermudez 1998).

experience in explicit nuclear contexts, see Ben Sheppard, "Too Close for Comfort : Ballistic Ambitions in South Asia," Jane ·s Defence Weekly. 19 May 1998.
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India, for its part, has used Canadian-made nuclear reactors to produce plutonium for its weapons program and acquired technological information for its missile development
program from both Russia and the US. India developed its recently tested Agni missile, with an estimated range of 2,000
kilometers, in part using technology originally purchased from
the US (Smith 1998, 8).
In addition, few have noted the ways in which North Korea's role in facilitating the missile proliferation in South Asia
helped set the scene for the current crisis.2 India's nuclear tests
came just five weeks after Pakistan successfully test-fired its
new Ghauri missile . This nuclear-capable missile, with an estimated range of up to 1,500 kilometers and an estimated payload
capacity of up to 700 kilograms, provides Pakistan with a potential nuclear threat against most major Indian cities. It is now
known that the Ghauri was developed from North Korean Nodong missiles, sold in complete form to Pakistan in 1997 (even
though they have yet to be provided to North Korea's own military) (Bermudez 1998, 27).
Through its direct contribution to accelerating the missile technology race in South Asia, North Korea 's actions helped
create the context within which India made its decision to conduct nuclear tests. Admittedly, the Ghauri test was at most a precipitating factor in the decision by India's ruling Bharatiya Party
to conduct the nuclear tests-a move that had been contemplated
by other Indian governments for many years. However, India's
deep-seated anxiety about its strategic position vis-a-vis China
has long been a central rationale for India's nuclear program.
Moreover, India has interpreted Chinese assistance to Pakistan as
a crucial indication of China's strategic concern. In this envi2

This missile sale advanced a North Korean-Pakistan

relationship dating back to the

i 970s and firmly established in the 1980s, when the two countries cooperated in providing military assistance to Iran in its eight year war with Iraq .
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ronment, the role played by North Korea's history of assistance
to Pakistan's missile development should not be discounted.
North Korean missile assistance to Pakistan, combined
with its own missile development activities, also represent an
important failure of the broader diplomatic effort by the US to
integrate North Korea into the world community and restrain its
"rogue" behavior. Despite the significant effort that the US has
invested in seeking to curb its missile technology proliferation,
meetings between the two countries on this issue have been
characterized mostly by a lack of progress and frequent breakdowns . Meanwhile, North Korea managed to conduct its sale of
missiles to Pakistan without obstruction.3 In the wake of the nuclear tests, North Korea, ignoring heightened attention to this
relationship, reportedly delivered to Pakistan several shipments
of weapons materials that included warhead canisters for the
Ghauri missile. These shipments reportedly took place amid indications that Pakistan is proceeding with production of the missile and development of nuclear warheads that can be carried by
it (Weiner 1998, A3).
US, Chinese, and North Korean missile assistance to India and Pakistan epitomizes the emergence of a set of mutually
reinforcing linkages among proliferation prospects-a proliferation network. This network introduces a new and troubling dimension to the problem of achieving arms control and preventing proliferation in the region and worldwide. This network is
still in a nascent stage, consisting of only a confluence of relationships rather than a mechanism of direct coordination. Nevertheless, even at this level, the emerging network of links posi3

Foreshadowing the now renowned US failure to anticipate India's first nuclear tests, US
offic ials have acknowledged that the US was unaware of the Ghauri transaction until it
was completed . See David Smith, "A Feared Scenario Around the Comer''; and Tim
Weiner, "US Says North Korea Helped Develop Pakistani Missile," The New York Times,
l lApril 1998, A3.
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tively reinforces incentives for proliferation across disparate
situations. Thus, more than ever, decisions and events in a given
situation and region are likely to have unexpected and unintended implications in other places at other times.
The link between circumstances of South Asia and the
Korean Peninsula exemplifies this point. Concurrent to, but
overshadowed by, the South Asian nuclear tests, North Korea
threatened to effectively "suspend" its 1994 "Agreed Framework" accord with the US under which it forsook its own incipient nuclear weapons program (Bermudez 1998). The US government immediately questioned North Korea's intention and/or
capacity to follow through on the specific threats to "reopen" the
reactors addressed under the Agreed Framework (Bermudez
1998). However, more recent events have suggested that concern
over the North Korean nuclear program is still warranted (Bermudez 1998). The threats have (or at least should have) served to
highlight a growing North Korean dissatisfaction with the rate of
progress in achieving the ends of the Agreed Framework and
improving its relations with the US (Bermudez 1998). This discontent has likely contributed to the failure of US diplomacy to
achieve North Korean missile proliferation restraint. This proliferation, in turn, then became a contributing factor in South Asian
instability and ultimately the nuclear tests.
Now, the South Asian tests may not only spark a nuclear
arms race in that region, but may also increase insecurity
throughout Asia . In a potential "feedback," events in South Asia
indirectly encouraged, if not provided direct incentives for, North
Korea's most recent actions-especially the August 31 missile
test. 4 More broadly, the changes circumstances in South Asia
"Many analysts have noted the apparently poor timing of the missile test, which aborted
Japan's pending approval of funding for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization (KEDO) and disrupted a promising round of talks with the US. Two of the
most prominent explanations for the North Korean action are that it was intended to
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have raised questions concerning the sustainability of the NPT
and may serve to obstruct ratification of the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty in the US Congress and START II in the Russian
Duma (Isaccs 1998, 40). These cascading consequences threaten
to erode the institutions, norms, and political cooperation supporting nuclear arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation
worldwide.
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL IN SOUTH ASIA

Having already fought three wars and more than once
having flirted with a fourth, India and Pakistan are often viewed
as two states most likely to wage a nuclear war. This may be an
exaggeration. The risk of nuclear conflict in South Asia is significant, but it can be controlled with the effective application of
arms control to stabilize nuclear deterrence between India and
Pakistan.
The US and Russia regulated the dangers of their global
nuclear rivalry through a series of unilateral actions, reciprocal
measures, and formally negotiated agreements to establish stable
political and military relations. This nuclear arms process took
place over several decades. It is not surprising that India and
Pakistan have been slow to develop a stable nuclear order in
South Asia. In response to recent military crises and the explosion of nuclear devices by each state, Indian and Pakistani leaders have learned to conduct military operations more cautiously
(they have concluded several confidence-building measures
[CBMs] on issues of marginal domestic and military importance), but they do not yet accept arms control as a way to enhance military security and stabilize strained political relations.
With both states engaged in costly defense preparations, fears of
demonstrate its missile capabilities to potential purchasers or, conversely, to raise the
"price" it would cost the US to curb the North Korean missile program.
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surprise attack, military escalation, and even nuclear conflict
loom over the subcontinent.
Although fashioned first to stabilize competition between the superpowers, nuclear arms control is now suitable for
South Asia. Arms control and CBMs can help India and Pakistan
avoid a war that neither side wants, minimize the costs and risks
of their arms competition, and curtail the scope and violence of
conflict should it recur in South Asia.5 Regional arms control is
important because each side engages in coercive strategic behavior-provocative troop movements and military exercise near
tense borders, alleged support for militant groups in unstable
regions of the other state, and recent cross-border firing along
the line of control in Kashmir (the de-facto India-Pakistan border)-and yet both governments know they cannot afford escalation to full-scale combat, much less nuclear conflict. Here I
analyze the opportunities, incentives, and obstacles for a specific
set of concepts and practices created by the superpowers during
the Cold War to operate in the strategic and cultural context of
contemporary South Asia.
Neither India nor Pakistan has openly manufactured nuclear forces, but both states have a nuclear weapons program and
could, on short notice, assemble and use such weapons. India has
a large quantity of bomb-grade plutonium, and few doubt the
ability of the Indian scientific community to make nuclear weapons following the country's 1974 "peaceful nuclear experiment"
and the 1998 underground tests. On the other side of the border,
Pakistan's enrichment plant at Kahuta is believed to have produced enough weapons-grade uranium for several nuclear devices as evidenced by its 1998 underground tests approximately
two weeks after India's. Because of concerns about ongoing
5

These are the three arms control goals that Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin
identified in Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 196 I), I.
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Pakistani efforts to develop these weapons, the US government
ended all economic and military assistance to Pakistan in October 1990; the cancellation remains in effect today. Pakistan and
India each have aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons to
targets inside each other 's territory; and both states are developing, or seeking to obtain, ballistic missiles that may also be able
to deliver nuclear warheads .
Several CBMs have been proposed for both India and
Pakistan : a regional cutoff of fissile material production , a regional nuclear test ban, safeguards on new and existing nuclear
facilities, extension of the no-attack pledge to cover population
centers, enhanced international security assurances , regional risk
reduction centers, upgraded hotlines between military and political officials, and regular exchanges of military personnel. However, even the best ideas cannot succeed in the absence of a stable arms control culture .
Effective and durable arms control requires India, Pakistan, and the US-the only outside power capable of facilitating
regional arms control presently-to develop the guidelines and
attitudes required for nuclear stability . Five obstacles impede
efforts to establish this culture in South Asia: (I) the diplomatic
preoccupation with nuclear disarmament to the detriment of
modest but yet feasible nuclear restraint measures ; (2) reluctance
to aclmowledge the military purposes of Indian and Pakistani
nuclear programs , preventing a realistic debate about reasonable
limits on nuclear forces and strategies ; (3) an unwillingness of
either side to pursue arms control as a vital source of national
security; (4) an inability to transform the India-Pakistan strategic
dialogue from tacit to explicit bargaining; and (5) the persistence
of resentment and defiance among India, Pakistan , and the US.
These obstacles are examined below.

VOL. 28 2000

62

IX)MJN

THE PROBLEMS OF NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY IN SOUTH ASIA

A major barrier to new thinking about nuclear deterrence
and arms control in the region is the persistence of the longespoused ideas of disarmament and denuclearization among the
three key actors involved: India, Pakistan, and the US. Traditional diplomatic measures on regional nuclear issues are firmly
entrenched in the foreign policy bureaucracies of each state .
Continued calls for the elimination of nuclear arms at the global
level by India and regionally by Pakistan and the US inhibit new
thinking about arms control. There are postures for change in the
region (experts in all three states argue for regional arms control
over disarmament) but this new thinking does not yet enjoy wide
support among policy elites.
India has long been an outspoken opponent of nuclear
deterrence and arms control. Even before independence , Jawaharlal Nehru campaigned to ban nuclear weapons. Like Mahatma
Gandhi, Nehru argued that nuclear violence could not be countered by threats of nuclear retaliation; this would spell the utter
destruction of humanity. Every Indian prime minister since has
viewed deterrence as immoral and as an irrational basis for national security in the nuclear age. This opinion was expressed
clearly in the Delhi Declaration of Rajiv Gandhi and Mikhail
Gorbachev in 1986 and in India's 1988 Action Plan on nuclear
disarmament. In welcoming the 1993 START II agreement, India
urged the "nuclear weapon states to re-examine doctrines on nuclear deterrence which have been used by them in (the) past to
justify expansion of their nuclear arsenals." (Indian Press Statement) .
India makes a sharp distinction between disarmament
and arms control, rejecting the latter as an incomplete and diversionary response to the nuclear danger. Largely ritualistic from
the 1940s through the 1970s, India's support of nuclear disarmament grew stronger in the 1980s. Despite mounting evidence
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of Pakistan's efforts to acquire a nuclear device in that decade,
the procession of political benefits Pakistan gained through its
espousal of regional denuclearization, mounting global pressures
on India to embrace regional arms restraint, and increased domestic pressure for India to declare itself as a nuclear weapon
state, India still advocated global nuclear disarmament. This
policy remains intact even as world attention has shifted from
East-West arms control to regional nonproliferation. Having long
viewed horizontal proliferation (rise in the number if nucleararmed states) and vertical proliferation (expansion of modernization of existing nuclear arsenals) as two sides of the same coin,
India is more outspoken about the latter and insists that both
problems must be solved simultaneously. Stressing the importance of equity in global nonproliferation efforts, Indian officials
still see the global elimination of nuclear forces as the only fair
and effective way to curb the spread of nuclear capabilities.
Popular support for this policy, the bureaucracy 's resistance to
rethink it, and the reluctance of political leaders to revise it are
three factors that sustain India's disarmament diplomacy.
As India stresses global denuclearization, the idea of regional disarmament preoccupies Pakistan. Pakistan did not participate actively in the global debates on nuclear arms during the
1950s. When Pakistan became alarmed concerning India's nuclear potential in the 1960s, however, Pakistan initiated a campaign to draw international attention to the military implications
of India's civil nuclear program and to raise diplomatic costs to
India of developing nuclear arms. Although policy means have
changed over time, these aims still guide Pakistan 's nuclear diplomacy.
During the 1960s and 1970s, Pakistan sought to prevent
India from going nuclear by encouraging international measures
to stop the spread of military nuclear capabilities to all nonnuclear weapon states. Pakistan was an early supporter of a nuclear
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Nawaz Sharif added another proposal in 1991 when he called for
five powers (the US, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan) to discuss the nuclear issue in South Asia. India has rejected all of
these regional nuclear disannament proposals.
THE US POSITION

As part of its global nonproliferation policy, the US
presently advocates nuclear disarmament for India and Pakistan.
US efforts to curb the bomb's spread rest on the premise that
new nuclear forces are inherently dangerous. While nonproliferation has been a steady goal, the US has changed its strategy
for controlling the bomb's spread globally and in South Asia
(Lavoy 1991, p735-783). Breaking with early US efforts to pressure India and Pakistan to join the NPT, the Clinton administration has urged these nuclear holdouts first to cap, then over time
to reduce, and finally to eliminate their nuclear arms capabilities.
In pursuit of this policy, the US stresses nonproliferation in bilateral discussions with India and Pakistan; it urges them to stop
producing fissile material for weapons purposes; it withholds
economic and military aid from Pakistan until nonproliferation is
verified; it supports high-level Indo-Pakistani talks on regional
security and nonproliferation; it presses China not to aid Pakistan's nuclear missile efforts; and it engages other states, particularly Russia, France, Germany, and Japan, to hold bilateral
nonproliferation discussions with India and Pakistan.
Through mid-1999, the US has little to show for its efforts. Despite improved relations with both states, particularly
after the 1995 visit of Prime Minister P.V. Rao to the US and the
January 1996 visit to the region by then Secretary of Defense
William Perry, tensions over the nuclear issue remain high between the US and the South Asian states especially in the wake
of the underground nuclear tests conducted by both states in
May/June, 1998. However, as US officials come to accept that
VOL. 28 2000

64

IXJMJN

nonproliferation treaty; in 1962 President Mohammed Ayub
Khan urged the world community to devise a "treaty to outlaw
the further spread of nuclear weapons" (Rai 1979, 241). While
acknowledging the need to control vertical proliferation, Pakistani diplomat Agha Shahi said that the top priority was to curb
horizontal proliferation, a problem he saw as a greater security
threat to nonnuclear weapon states, and insisted that "to tie the
question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons to other measures restricting the nuclear arms race only result in an impasse"
(Documents on Disarmament 1967). In the end, Pakistan refused
to sign the NPT because it was not binding on India, which refused to sign, and because it contained no mechanism for assuring the security of Pakistan and other nonnuclear weapon states.
Shortly after the NPT failure, and less than a year after
Pakistan 's loss in the 1971 war, Pakistan launched a two-track
policy to match and contain India 's growing nuclear might. In
early 1972, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto secretly directed
his top scientists to start work on a nuclear weapons program.
Several months later Bhutto initiated the second track-a bid to
obtain Indian denuclearization through a diplomatic campaign to
rid south Asia of nuclear weapons. Originally announced at the
unveiling of a Pakistani nuclear reactor in late 1972, a South
Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone plan was submitted by Pakistan
to the UN in November 1974, six months after India's first nuclear test.
Pakistan continued to pursue each policy track in the
1980. As part of his diplomatic offensive against India, General
Zia ul-Haq opposed six measures for regional disarmament:
mutual renunciation of nuclear arms; inspection of each side's
nuclear facilities; simultaneous acceptance of IAEA full-scope
safeguards; joint accession to the NPT; a bilateral nuclear test
ban; and a multilateral conference under UN auspices on nuclear
nonproliferation in South Asia (Naqvi 1994, 11). Prime Minister
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nuclear disarmament may no longer be a feasible goal for this
region, the US appears gradually to be pushing for India and
Pakistan to practice arms control. Secretary William Cohen suggested as much in a June 1997 speech: "I recognized that the
nuclear ambitions of India and Pakistan flow from a dynamic
that we are unlikely to be able to influence in the near term. We
might be able to gain influence over the long haul, but only if in
the meantime we can prevent the tension from flaring into another conflict" (Defense News 1997).
The US pragmatic line is now finding support in surprising places. Conceding that nuclear disarmament is beyond
reach globally and in South Asia, and convinced that current
diplomatic approached are counter productive, a new group of
Indian and Pakistani defense specialists back arms control as a
means to enhance security and to avoid nuclear war. Indian
military experts K. Subrahmanyam and General K. Sundarji accept the permanence of nuclear forces in the region and stress the
need for India and Pakistan to learn to live peacefully in such an
environment (Subrahmanyam 1992). Although the Indian government still pushes global nuclear disarmament and is not prepared to act on the nuclear realist perspective, it is showing
greater flexibility and pragmatism . After the military crisis over
Kashmir, India embraced the concept of confidence-building
with Pakistan; several CBMs were negotiated and implemented
by the two sides over the next three years (i.e., a ban on flights
within five kilometers of the line of control in Kashmir, prenotification of military exercises).6 In Pakistan, too, there are
isolated signs of willingness to move beyond the traditional policy of regional denuclearization to stabilize regional security. For
6

For a thorough discussion of these measures , see Michael Krepon , Dominique M.
McKoy, and Matthew C.J. Rudolph , eds ., A Handbook of Confidence-Building Measures
for Regional Security, Handbook No. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center,
1993).
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example, retired general K.M. Arif has urged India and Pakistan
to consider turning the region into a "nuclear safe zone (that is, a
region where nuclear deterrence is stable)" (Arif 1996, 18).
Neither India or Pakistan accepts this plan yet, but the tide is
turning : officials in the US, India, and Pakistan now seriously
consider various nuclear arms control proposals if they do not
yet embrace them.
THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR OPACITY

The common reluctance of India and Pakistan to discuss
openly their force capabilities and intentions poses two problems
for regional nuclear security. The first concerns the strategic instability arising out of covert nuclear forces . The second problem
is that nuclear opacity impedes Indian and Pakistani efforts to
openly propose, negotiate, and accept nuclear arms control
agreements. 7 This opacity leads policymakers to work out in private measures that would be politically unpopular if publicized
in either country.

Strategic Stability
Many experts believe that secrecy concerning nuclear
capabilities, force employment doctrines, targeting plans , and
escalation thresholds weakens deterrence and creates other political and military problems . Shai Feldman argues that covert
nuclear weapons programs entail closed decision making without
wider scrutiny, dominance of the military in the formulation of
doctrine, biases toward offense and preemption, and strained crisis management and nuclear signaling (Feldman 1992, 11). Gen' Nuclear opacity is a term used to describe the nuclear policies of India, Pakistan , Israel,
and possibly other emerging nuclear states . Opaque nuclear states deny possession of
nuclear warheads, do not make direct nuclear threats, do not deploy nuclear weapons, and
do not openly debate nuclear plans. For further discussion see Avner Cohen and Benjamin Frankel, Opaque Nuclear Proliferation , (London : Frank Cass, I 99 I), 14-44.
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eral Sundarji sees two strategic problems of nuclear opacity for
South Asia : the possibility of a war between India and Pakistan
triggered through miscalculation of each other 's nuclear status
and ignorance of each other 's nuclear doctrines; the difficulties
ensuring the safety of nuclear warheads and the prevention of
their unauthorized use in a clandestine state (Sundarji 1997, 19).
On the other hand, nuclear opacity probably is required
to preserve non-weaponized deterrence between India and Pakistan . George Perkovich and others contend that a condition of
mutual deterrence deriving from the power of India and Pakistan
to assemble nuclear arms quickly can be a steady source of regional security (Pekovich 1993, 23). These analysts recognize,
however, that the stability of non-weaponized deterrence requires
India and Pakistan to undertake a demanding set of CBMs to
assure each other and the international community that they have
not built weapons and that they seek a situation of mutual security.
Arms Control
In South Asia, nuclear arms have a meaning that extends
well beyond their value as military and strategic bargaining instruments . Large portions of the region's informed population
see civilian and military nuclear programs as components of, and
indeed symbols for, national sovereignty and security. Thus, it is
difficult for Indian and Pakistani officials to make public concessions on nuclear issues. If India and Pakistan move to embrace
nuclear arms control, it will be difficult for them to cultivate
popular support for measures that very few citizens understand
because of years of government secrecy. Obscure nuclear proliferation in South Asia may have constrained a regional arms race
and provided military policymakers flexibility in negotiations,
but it has done so at the cost of preventing Indian and Pakistani
leaders from cultivating domestic constituencies for nuclear arms
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control and from identifying the precise nuclear security problems that are in the most need of control.
PRESENT TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND LIMITATIONS

Neither India nor Pakistan has accepted limits on military activities that either state realistically might wish to pursue
at some point in the future. Past and present Indo-Pakistani treaties and CBMs have helped to reduce tensions and resolve troublesome disputes but have not significantly altered the sources of
military rivalry, stabilized nuclear security, nor seriously constrained the strategic behavior of either state.8 Arms control does
not yet play a central role in South Asian military and nuclear
affairs.
Even in light of their recent underground detonations,
India and Pakistan concluded their most consequential military
pacts after their three wars. The costs of conflict forced them to
negotiate measures for troop disengagement's and to make minor
territorial adjustments along disputed borders; but neither side
treated these settlements as conclusive since they did not solve
basic problems-especially those underlying the Kashmir dispute (Makeig 1997, 272).
India and Pakistan jointly observe several military
CBMs. Driven to avoid another violent conflict in the aftermath

1

The simmering Kashmir dispute, the cause of two previous wars between India and
Pakistan, shot to international prominence in 1998 after both states detonated underground nuclear devices and declared themselves nuclear powers. While there have been
many CB Ms between these two states over the past decade, as of this writing, both Pakistan and India were warning of war six weeks into a bloody offensive to secure a vital
highway in Kashmir from guerrillas (these guerrillas are believed to be a combination of
Afghan mercenaries and Pakistan Army regulars who have occupied an 88-mile stretch of
the snow-capped peaks and ridges shooting anything that moved on the highway) in the
towering Himalayan heights . However , it would appear that the heavily armed guerrillas
have been pushed back closer to the military Line of Control dividing India and Pakistan,
allowing both sides to breath a sigh of relief.
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of the Second India-Pakistan war, the two states agreed in 1966
to provide prior notification of border exercises. In 1982, they
established the Indo-Pakistan Joint Commission. Designed to
facilitate normal relations between the two states by creating a
forum for bilateral cooperation in communications, consular affairs, cultural exchanges, trade, smuggling, and, more recently,
drug trafficking, the commission convened several formal sessions at the foreign minister level and more sessions at lower
levels.
As separatist violence in Indian-held Kashmir accelerated in 1990, Indian and Pakistani troops fought armed skirmishes along the line of control. The heightened risk of a fourth
Indian-Pakistan war quickly focused government attention in
India and Pakistan , and even more so in the US, on the need for
military CBMs. After a year of little progress , the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan met in New Delhi in April 1991 and
signed two major agreements, one pledging nonviolation by
military aircraft of each other 's airspace and the other requiring
each state to provide advance information about any military
exercises and troop movements along common borders . India
and Pakistan subsequently established a formal line of communication (hotline) between their military commanders and there is a
new bus line linking the two states making travel between them
much easier.
Despite this impressive paperwork , few regional CBMs
operate according to plan. Both states violate no-fly zones for
combat aircraft and helicopters to map terrain across the border.
Each state's underground nuclear tests has violated the agreement on prior notification of military exercises. Abuses of the
military hotline are also reported: after opening fire and inflicting casualties on enemy troops in Kashmir and on the Siachin
glacier the attacking party can call the enemy on the hotline to
prevent hostilities from widening . Military and civilian officials
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in the region remain skeptical of arms control as a means to enhance national security.
The track record of CBMs in South Asia is spotty, at
best. Both India and Pakistan assert that trust is lacking and is
the key ingredient to improved relations, but neither state has
chosen to generate trust through CBMs voluntarily negotiated.
Now that nuclear dangers and regional instabilities have grown,
India and Pakistan might do well to implement existing CBMs
properly. New nuclear risk reduction measures might also be
considered in bilateral negotiations. Will India and Pakistan now
take CBM implementation more seriously than in the past? One
clear indication will be whether both states again dwell on rhetorical initiatives designed for public relation purposes or move
instead to negotiate concrete measures to reduce nuclear dangers.
BARGAINING

In the 1980s India and Pakistan enjoyed strong political
leaders who had sufficient maneuvering room at home and the
confidence needed to engage the other side and to de-escalate
crises. It is not obvious that the tacit bargaining that worked well
in the 1980s can be managed as effectively in the present era.
Religious revivalist outbursts, spy scandals, feverish nationalism,
communal rioting and bombings, and recent low-intensity conflict in Kashmir have disrupted the political dialogue. The transformation of domestic politics in each state, marked by the rise
of the religious right and the erosion of national leadership,
makes it necessary to formalize arms control negotiations.
The effectiveness of tacit bargaining depends on the current state of relations between India and Pakistan and on the
strength of each side's political leaders. Unfortunately, India and
Pakistan have had weak and unstable governments for several
years and there are no signs that political conditions are improving in either state. In response to a July 1998 call for bilateral
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tension-reducing talks by Pakistan 's foreign minister, for example, Indian foreign minister Salman Khursheed stated: "India
wants to ease these tensions, but there is a period of uncertainty
in Pakistan . For the present let us wait and watch" (Nation 1997,
29). This attitude remains . Unilateral restraint and tacit CBMs
are important in any adversarial relationship, especially when the
threat of nuclear war is involved; but arms control must be formally negotiated and ratified if it is to gamer widespread domestic support and survive sudden changes in political leadership ,
popular sentiment, and international events.
INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND THE US:
UNDERSTANDING AND RECIPROCITY

The final barrier to creating a viable arms control regime
in South Asia is the prevalence of resentment and defiance
among India, Pakistan, and the US. Specific conflicts have confounded amicable relations among these states, but, more important , each state often acts with moralism and sometimes hypocrisy . The lack of trust and understanding between India and
Pakistan is well known ; neither side is willing to initiate a relationship of reciprocated good gestures. The animosity created by
differences over the nuclear issue between the US and India and
Pakistan is also destructive. US nonproliferation pressure inhibits
open discussions between India and Pakistan on regional nuclear
security. Pakistanis resent the imposition of the 1985 Pressler
amendment (US legislation banning economic and military aid to
Pakistan because of Pakistan 's nuclear weapons activities) ,
which they see as discriminatory and Indians object as strongly
to US pressure on New Delhi to join the NPT and curb space and
missile activities. Consequently, much Indian and Pakistani diplomatic energy goes to diverting US pressure rather than thinking
about and proposing creative ideas to promote regional nuclear
security.
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At a deeper psychological level, the sense of US and
collective Western pressure on nonproliferation perpetuates antiWestern feelings. Such sentiments could produce a situation far
more serious than that created by the "nuclear nationalism" that
presently exists in India and Pakistan. Despite fragmentation of
the domestic fabric in both states, the defense of national sovereignty, which the nuclear program symbolize, is a strong rallying
cry. In a colonial region that has a long history of anti-Western
populism, the US strategy of technology denial and punitive actions has the potential to trigger a new round of anti-Western
activism.
CONCLUSION:
TOWARD A NEW NONPROLIFERATION STRATEGY

The current erosion of the nonproliferation regime and a
lack of any real arms control measures should not be too surprising . The challenge now facing organizations and states
working toward nonproliferation and arms control objectives is
to recast those objectives to fit the post-Cold War era. The new
characteristics of this era include a disaggregation of the Cold
War 's bipolar organization of world politics , the resulting greater
complexity and ambiguity of international relationships, and
hence the increasing relevance of less obvious links among disparate regions and circumstances. The bottom line is that proliferation problems can no longer (if they ever could) be treated in
isolation from one another. The problem of proliferation is better
understood and treated in an integrated and holistic manner.
Accordingly, states and non-governmental organizations
seeking to promote arms control and nonproliferation need to
begin with a strategy that recognizes the importance of links
among discrete proliferation problems. This strategy would entail seeking to identify those links when fashioning solutions,
and therefore would require active and multifaceted interaction,
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incorporating positive as well as negative inducements. Adopting
such a strategy, which might best be called comprehensive engagement, would be a first step toward generating a nonproliferation regime strong enough-and inclusive enough-to overcome current incentives for proliferation .
For states in general, and for the US in particular, a strategy of comprehensive engagement would go beyond the tactics
of selective engagement manifested in recent years, by fully embracing each of five elements. First, comprehensive engagement
must continue to involve bilateral engagement on a state-by-state
basis. This is the current US policy premise towards North Korea, and no other policy premise holds more promise despite the
ruling regime 's inscrutability and recalcitrance. Shutting off current contacts would only encourage this "isolated" regime to bolster its existing contacts with other proliferation aspirants, such
as Iran and Pakistan. Indeed, simply the prospect that existing
punitive policies will be ended offers incentives for regimes,
such as that in North Korea, to respond positively to direct engagement (one source of the recent decline in US-DPRK relations is in fact a growing conviction among North Korean leaders that there exists no real prospect of ending current US economic sanctions) . However, even in such bilateral contexts, there
is room for more integrated approached treating bilateral relationships in their entireties and focusing on the linkages between
different issues within those relationships .
Second, comprehensive engagement means sustaining
requisite levels of attention and commitment to engagement over
time. Too often, the US focuses on a proliferation problem only
at moments of crisis. The specific efforts to engage North Korea
in 1993-94 and India today-while laudable under the circumstances--<lemonstrate this tendency. Moreover, in allowing itself
to gamer a reputation for addressing problems only when they
become crises, the US risks encouraging states, or even nonTHE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
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governmental actors, to create crises by taking provocative action in order to be regarded "seriously" by US policy makers.
Such thinking may have been an underlying factor in India's decision to go forward with its nuclear testing, and is likely a key
source of the current crisis between the US and North Korea.
The US cannot hope to sustain a consistent and successful nonproliferation policy if each abated crisis is followed by waning
attentions and flagging efforts, which only sow the seeds of a
new crisis.
Third, comprehensive engagement requires a conception
of involvement with a region as a dynamic system, not simply
with each of the states within it. In particular, the US has too often neglected the long-term systemic implications of seemingly
prudent short-term tactics, thereby directly contributing to the
type of regional proliferation it ostensibly opposes. For example,
the Chinese M-11 sale to Pakistan followed shortly the US sale
of F-16 fighters to Taiwan, which China saw as a direct violation
of the US pledge to limit transfers of military weaponry to Taiwan.9 To the extent that the F-16 sale to Taiwan undermined US
credibility in persuading China to limit its own arms transfers in
the region, the sale may have indirectly contributed to South
Asian missile proliferation. At a broader level, this US tendency
to ignore longer-term regional consequences of shorter-term,
bilaterally-focused decisions has contributed to creating the peculiar situation in which both India and China perceive the US to
be tacitly and/or surreptitiously tilting in support toward the
other.10 The US will be unable to achieve nonproliferation gener9

1n the 1982 joint communique with China , the US agreed not to increase weapons sales
to Taiwan "either in qualitative or in quantitative terms" beyond the levels of preceding
years, and to reduce over time.
10
A!though the circumstance is likely most symptomatic of the level of distrust and suspiciousness characterizing India-China relations , working to overcome these perceptions
will be an important determinant of US effectiveness in acting as an agent of nondiscriminatory norms in Asia.
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ally until it can more effectively anticipate such long-term systemic consequences into its short-term decision making .
Fourth, comprehensive engagement must mean that the
US and other nuclear weapon states seeking nonproliferation
recognize more clearly how their own lack of progress toward
nuclear arms control increases pressures for nuclear acquisition.
Despite their commitment to the goal of vertical disarmament in
the NPT, nuclear arms control negotiations between the US and
the Soviet Union only achieved a brief period of respite in the
two superpowers' nuclear arms race. Occasionally, as in the
SALT I Treaty 's incentives to develop MIRV missile technologies, they even redirected that race in new and more dangerous
directions. After important early progress, the slowing pace of
the START process falls short of the arms control promises offered by the US in negotiations for an indefinite extension of the
NPT in 1995. The growing disregard of this promise by nuclear
weapon states now threatens to undermine preparations for the
next review of the NPT in 2000. 11 At the same time, US programs for sub-critical nuclear testing and continuing weapons
"stewardship" effectively obviate much of the spirit, if not the
letter, of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Thus, India does
have a point, if not justification, in emphasizing years of unfulfilled promises for progress toward disarmament by nucleararmed states as motivations for its own nuclear program. Indeed,
this relation between "vertical" and "horizontal" proliferation is
one of the essential linkages of the proliferation network. The
US and other nuclear-armed states cannot expect their condem11
The breakdown and failure of the second Preparatory Committee meeting for the 2000
Review Conference , held April 27 to May 8, 1998, was in good measure due to the widespread perception that the nuclear weapons states (particularly the US and Russia) were
attempting to rollback the commitments to disarmament included the decisions underlying the 1995 indefinite extens ion of the NPT .
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nation oflndia 's actions to be credible in the absence of recognition of this linkage .
Finally, comprehensive engagement means developing
an appreciation for the political context of proliferation. During
the Cold War, a popular tendency developed to regard nuclear
weapons issues as independent of politics. Ironically, nuclear
strategists and nuclear abolitionists shared this perception : the
former holding that nuclear weapons impose a logic of their
own, bestowing a certain universality to theories of deterrence
and war-fighting; the latter in holding that the sheer horror of
nuclear war renders use of nuclear weapons "unthinkable." The
end of the Cold War itself repudiates this notion. Despite force
levels and launching capabilities that are as lethal as ever, the
perceived nuclear war between the US and Russia has been dramatically reduced. The source of this reduced threat of war is the
improvement in political relations between these states, which
has decreased the animosities and uncertainties that have always
lurked behind the abstract veneer of strategic theory. Improved
political relations , not strategy, moved the superpowers toward
greater actual peace. The lesson for South Asia is clear: only sufficiently thorough and enduring improvements in the political
climate (such as the hotline, the new busline, etc.) can reduce
intrinsic temptations to proliferate, thus offering hope of achieving nonproliferation goals in the long term. Neither the spread of
nuclear weapons, nor the prevention of that spread through punitive sanctions or coercive counter-proliferation , is likely to help
produce that peace .
The proliferation problem in Asia today has many
sources, of which the shortcomings of US nonproliferation policy constitute only one. However, the US, now the world's sole
superpower and likely to remain so for quite some time to come,
has an assurance of its own basic security needs and hence a
latitude of behavior far exceeding that of any other nation . The
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long shadow that its own nuclear weapons attitudes and policies
cast over those of all other governments provides the US with a
unique capacity to lead by example on nuclear weapons issues.
This offers the US an unprecedented opportunity to articulate
and pursue a long-term vision for national and global security in
which the threats to use nuclear weapons is dramatically reduced
or even eliminated .
Whether or not the US is able to take the lead in building
regional and global security regimes that rely less on threats to
use nuclear weapons , this nevertheless must remain the essential
goal of nonproliferation advocates . During the Cold War 's long
nuclear stalemate, the argument arose that mutual nuclear deterrence was in fact a force for peace, strongly discouraging actual
war between the superpowers. Such perceptions endure; indeed,
one of the most intractable features of the proliferation problem
is that not all agree even that proliferation is a problem . Clearly
this was not the view of the great majority of Indian and Pakistani citizens who favored their countries ' acquisition of deployed nuclear capabilities--even as many of them also anticipated the eventual use of these weapons.
This notion is an illusion: the psychological vulnerability
and political tension engendered by mutual assured destruction
provided genuine security to no state. While the threat of nuclear
destruction may have helped to stave off overt military conflict
among nuclear-armed states, nuclear deterrence did nothing to
promote the resolution of the political conflicts fueling the rivalries of these states. The improved conditions of major power relations in the wake of the Cold War, however limited they remain, reveal starkly the paucity of the "security" provided to the
superpowers by their nuclear weapons during the Cold War itself. Progress toward a genuine nuclear disarmament, in all its
facets, depends upon debunking the illusion of "nuclear peace"
wherever it emerges, and building security regimes that would
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aim ultimately at replacing persistent dependence on nuclear deterrence.
The predominant justification for India's and Pakistan's
nuclear tests, drawing as they do on Cold War conceptions of the
political utility of nuclear weapons and other technologies of
weapons of mass destruction, represent a dramatic turn away
from this realization . India and Pakistan certainly perceive themselves as pursuing legitimate security interests and in fact behaving no differently than did the US and the Soviet Union
throughout the Cold War. Indeed, many of the US' own nuclear
policies and practices also still derive from such calculations.
However, emulation is not validation. In a nuclear-armed South
Asia, India will depend for its security-as it never has beforeon the prudence, competence, and authority of decision makers
in Pakistan (just as the US, as much today as during the Cold
War, relied upon command and control coherence in Russia). For
its part, in addition to a similar security dependence upon India,
Pakistan will labor under crushing economic and political burdens to maintain not only its "nuclear deterrent" but also its very
integrity as a state. Meanwhile, for citizens of Bangladesh, Sri
Lanka, and other neighboring states, the world today is an irrevocably more dangerous place.
The US has already accomplished much to lay the foundations for stricter controls on and dramatic reductions in nuclear
weapons worldwide. However, the US and other nuclear powers
need to do more to maintain regional stability in South Asia. The
world looks to the US, as the sole remaining superpower, for
leadership. However, paradoxically, it is mainly the US' attitude,
not India's or Pakistan 's, that ensures the continuing legitimacy
of nuclear weapons . The US, and the other declared nuclear
weapon states, should stop preaching nuclear chastity until they,
too, are willing to forswear nuclear weapons. The dictum, "do as
we say, not as we do" is hypocritical; great powers lead by exVOL. 28 2000
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ample, not by empty words (Hagerty 1998, 195-196). The
agenda prescribed in this essay is ambitious and will not be accomplished quickly, but the time has come to intensify the effort
to achieve it and finally lead by example.
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